ural degrees.

The first is, if cavalry alone are employed; in that case it amounts
usually more to alarming and watching than to pressing the enemy in
reality, because the smallest obstacle of ground is generally sufficient
to check the pursuit. Useful as cavalry may be against single bodies of
broken demoralised troops, still when opposed to the bulk of the beaten
Army it becomes again only the auxiliary arm, because the troops in
retreat can employ fresh reserves to cover the movement, and, therefore,
at the next trifling obstacle of ground, by combining all arms they can
make a stand with success. The only exception to this is in the case of
an army in actual flight in a complete state of dissolution.

The second degree is, if the pursuit is made by a strong advance-guard
composed of all arms, the greater part consisting naturally of cavalry.
Such a pursuit generally drives the enemy as far as the nearest strong
position for his rear-guard, or the next position affording space for
his Army. Neither can usually be found at once, and, therefore, the
pursuit can be carried further; generally, however, it does not extend
beyond the distance of one or at most a couple of leagues, because
otherwise the advance-guard would not feel itself sufficiently
supported. The third and most vigorous degree is when the victorious
Army itself continues to advance as far as its physical powers can
endure. In this case the beaten Army will generally quit such ordinary
positions as a country usually offers on the mere show of an attack, or
of an intention to turn its flank; and the rear-guard will be still less
likely to engage in an obstinate resistance.

In all three cases the night, if it sets in before the conclusion of
the whole act, usually puts an end to it, and the few instances in which
this has not taken place, and the pursuit has been continued throughout
the night, must be regarded as pursuits in an exceptionally vigorous
form.

If we reflect that in fighting by night everything must be, more or
less, abandoned to chance, and that at the conclusion of a battle the
regular cohesion and order of things in an army must inevitably be
disturbed, we may easily conceive the reluctance of both Generals to
carrying on their business under such disadvantageous conditions. If a
complete dissolution of the vanquished Army, or a rare superiority
of the victorious Army in military virtue does not ensure success,
everything would in a m