anner be given up to fate, which can never be for
the interest of any one, even of the most fool-hardy General. As a rule,
therefore, night puts an end to pursuit, even when the battle has only
been decided shortly before darkness sets in. This allows the conquered
either time for rest and to rally immediately, or, if he retreats
during the night it gives him a march in advance. After this break the
conquered is decidedly in a better condition; much of that which had
been thrown into confusion has been brought again into order, ammunition
has been renewed, the whole has been put into a fresh formation.
Whatever further encounter now takes place with the enemy is a new
battle not a continuation of the old, and although it may be far from
promising absolute success, still it is a fresh combat, and not merely a
gathering up of the debris by the victor.

When, therefore, the conqueror can continue the pursuit itself
throughout the night, if only with a strong advance-guard composed
of all arms of the service, the effect of the victory is immensely
increased, of this the battles of Leuthen and La Belle Alliance(*) are
examples.

(*) Waterloo.

The whole action of this pursuit is mainly tactical, and we only dwell
upon it here in order to make plain the difference which through it may
be produced in the effect of a victory.

This first pursuit, as far as the nearest stopping-point, belongs as a
right to every conqueror, and is hardly in any way connected with his
further plans and combinations. These may considerably diminish the
positive results of a victory gained with the main body of the Army, but
they cannot make this first use of it impossible; at least cases of that
kind, if conceivable at all, must be so uncommon that they should have
no appreciable influence on theory. And here certainly we must say
that the example afforded by modern Wars opens up quite a new field for
energy. In preceding Wars, resting on a narrower basis, and altogether
more circumscribed in their scope, there were many unnecessary
conventional restrictions in various ways, but particularly in this
point. THE CONCEPTION, HONOUR OF VICTORY seemed to Generals so much
by far the chief thing that they thought the less of the complete
destruction of the enemy's military force, as in point of fact that
destruction of force appeared to them only as one of the many means in
War, not by any means as the principal, much less as the only means; so