fresh ammunition to those who are without. All these things place
the conqueror himself in the state of crisis of which we have already
spoken. If now the defeated force is only a detached portion of
the enemy's Army, or if it has otherwise to expect a considerable
reinforcement, then the conqueror may easily run into the obvious danger
of having to pay dear for his victory, and this consideration, in such
a case, very soon puts an end to pursuit, or at least restricts it
materially. Even when a strong accession of force by the enemy is not
to be feared, the conqueror finds in the above circumstances a powerful
check to the vivacity of his pursuit. There is no reason to fear
that the victory will be snatched away, but adverse combats are still
possible, and may diminish the advantages which up to the present have
been gained. Moreover, at this moment the whole weight of all that is
sensuous in an Army, its wants and weaknesses, are dependent on the will
of the Commander. All the thousands under his command require rest
and refreshment, and long to see a stop put to toil and danger for the
present; only a few, forming an exception, can see and feel beyond the
present moment, it is only amongst this little number that there is
sufficient mental vigour to think, after what is absolutely necessary at
the moment has been done, upon those results which at such a moment only
appear to the rest as mere embellishments of victory--as a luxury of
triumph. But all these thousands have a voice in the council of the
General, for through the various steps of the military hierarchy these
interests of the sensuous creature have their sure conductor into the
heart of the Commander. He himself, through mental and bodily fatigue,
is more or less weakened in his natural activity, and thus it happens
then that, mostly from these causes, purely incidental to human nature,
less is done than might have been done, and that generally what is done
is to be ascribed entirely to the THIRST FOR GLORY, the energy, indeed
also the HARD-HEARTEDNESS of the General-in-Chief. It is only thus we
can explain the hesitating manner in which many Generals follow up a
victory which superior numbers have given them. The first pursuit of the
enemy we limit in general to the extent of the first day, including the
night following the victory. At the end of that period the necessity of
rest ourselves prescribes a halt in any case.

This first pursuit has different nat