ces opposed to each other, and between
the States to which these forces belong. But at the same time that the
principal mass of the force available is brought to the great duel, a
great decision is also brought on, the extent of which may perhaps be
foreseen in many respects, though not in all, and which although not the
only one, still is the FIRST decision, and as such, has an influence
on those which succeed. Therefore a deliberately planned great battle,
according to its relations, is more or less, but always in some degree,
to be regarded as the leading means and central point of the whole
system. The more a General takes the field in the true spirit of War
as well as of every contest, with the feeling and the idea, that is the
conviction, that he must and will conquer, the more he will strive to
throw every weight into the scale in the first battle, hope and strive
to win everything by it. Buonaparte hardly ever entered upon a War
without thinking of conquering his enemy at once in the first battle,(*)
and Frederick the Great, although in a more limited sphere, and with
interests of less magnitude at stake, thought the same when, at the head
of a small Army, he sought to disengage his rear from the Russians or
the Federal Imperial Army.
(*) This was Moltke's essential idea in his preparations for
the War of 1870. See his secret memorandum issued to G.O.C.s
on May 7. 1870, pointing to a battle on the Upper Saar as
his primary purpose.--EDITOR.
The decision which is given by the great battle, depends, we have said,
partly on the battle itself, that is on the number of troops engaged,
and partly on the magnitude of the success.
How the General may increase its importance in respect to the first
point is evident in itself and we shall merely observe that according
to the importance of the great battle, the number of cases which are
decided along with it increases, and that therefore Generals who,
confident in themselves have been lovers of great decisions, have always
managed to make use of the greater part of their troops in it without
neglecting on that account essential points elsewhere.
As regards the consequences or speaking more correctly the effectiveness
of a victory, that depends chiefly on four points:
1. On the tactical form adopted as the order of battle.
2. On the nature of the country.
3. On the relative proportions of the three arms.
4. On the relative strength of th
|