y, Buonaparte's campaigns and battles will be looked
upon as mere acts of barbarism and stupidity, and we shall once more
turn with satisfaction and confidence to the dress-sword of obsolete and
musty institutions and forms. If theory gives a caution against this,
then it renders a real service to those who listen to its warning voice.
MAY WE SUCCEED IN LENDING A HAND TO THOSE WHO IN OUR DEAR NATIVE LAND
ARE CALLED UPON TO SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY ON THESE MATTERS, THAT WE MAY BE
THEIR GUIDE INTO THIS FIELD OF INQUIRY, AND EXCITE THEM TO MAKE A CANDID
EXAMINATION OF THE SUBJECT.(**)
(*) On the Continent only, it still preserves full vitality
in the minds of British politicians and pressmen.--EDITOR.
(**) This prayer was abundantly granted--vide the German
victories of 1870.--EDITOR.
Not only the conception of War but experience also leads us to look
for a great decision only in a great battle. From time immemorial, only
great victories have led to great successes on the offensive side in
the absolute form, on the defensive side in a manner more or less
satisfactory. Even Buonaparte would not have seen the day of Ulm, unique
in its kind, if he had shrunk from shedding blood; it is rather to
be regarded as only a second crop from the victorious events in his
preceding campaigns. It is not only bold, rash, and presumptuous
Generals who have sought to complete their work by the great venture
of a decisive battle, but also fortunate ones as well; and we may
rest satisfied with the answer which they have thus given to this vast
question.
Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody
slaughter is a horrible sight, then that is a ground for paying more
respect to War, but not for making the sword we wear blunter and blunter
by degrees from feelings of humanity, until some one steps in with one
that is sharp and lops off the arm from our body.
We look upon a great battle as a principal decision, but certainly not
as the only one necessary for a War or a campaign. Instances of a great
battle deciding a whole campaign, have been frequent only in modern
times, those which have decided a whole War, belong to the class of rare
exceptions.
A decision which is brought about by a great battle depends naturally
not on the battle itself, that is on the mass of combatants engaged in
it, and on the intensity of the victory, but also on a number of other
relations between the military for
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