ore important to characterise a general action
in its modern form before we advance with the study of its employment in
strategy.

What do we do now usually in a great battle? We place ourselves quietly
in great masses arranged contiguous to and behind one another. We deploy
relatively only a small portion of the whole, and let it wring itself
out in a fire-combat which lasts for several hours, only interrupted now
and again, and removed hither and thither by separate small shocks
from charges with the bayonet and cavalry attacks. When this line has
gradually exhausted part of its warlike ardour in this manner and there
remains nothing more than the cinders, it is withdrawn(*) and replaced
by another.

(*) The relief of the fighting line played a great part in
the battles of the Smooth-Bore era; it was necessitated by
the fouling of the muskets, physical fatigue of the men and
consumption of ammunition, and was recognised as both
necessary and advisable by Napoleon himself.--EDITOR.

In this manner the battle on a modified principle burns slowly away
like wet powder, and if the veil of night commands it to stop, because
neither party can any longer see, and neither chooses to run the risk of
blind chance, then an account is taken by each side respectively of the
masses remaining, which can be called still effective, that is, which
have not yet quite collapsed like extinct volcanoes; account is taken of
the ground gained or lost, and of how stands the security of the rear;
these results with the special impressions as to bravery and cowardice,
ability and stupidity, which are thought to have been observed
in ourselves and in the enemy are collected into one single total
impression, out of which there springs the resolution to quit the field
or to renew the combat on the morrow.

This description, which is not intended as a finished picture of
a modern battle, but only to give its general tone, suits for the
offensive and defensive, and the special traits which are given, by
the object proposed, the country, &c. &c., may be introduced into it,
without materially altering the conception.

But modern battles are not so by accident; they are so because
the parties find themselves nearly on a level as regards military
organisation and the knowledge of the Art of War, and because the
warlike element inflamed by great national interests has broken through
artificial limits and now flows in its nat