. These relations although
gradually becoming modified, continued until the first Silesian War, and
it was not until the Seven Years' War that attacks on an enemy posted in a
difficult country gradually became feasible, and of ordinary occurrence:
ground did not certainly cease to be a principle of strength to those
making use of its aid, but it was no longer a charmed circle, which shut
out the natural forces of War.

During the past thirty years War has perfected itself much more in this
respect, and there is no longer anything which stands in the way of a
General who is in earnest about a decision by means of battle; he can
seek out his enemy, and attack him: if he does not do so he cannot
take credit for having wished to fight, and the expression he offered
a battle which his opponent did not accept, therefore now means nothing
more than that he did not find circumstances advantageous enough for a
battle, an admission which the above expression does not suit, but which
it only strives to throw a veil over.

It is true the defensive side can no longer refuse a battle, yet he may
still avoid it by giving up his position, and the role with which that
position was connected: this is however half a victory for the offensive
side, and an acknowledgment of his superiority for the present.

This idea in connection with the cartel of defiance can therefore no
longer be made use of in order by such rhodomontade to qualify the
inaction of him whose part it is to advance, that is, the offensive. The
defender who as long as he does not give way, must have the credit of
willing the battle, may certainly say, he has offered it if he is not
attacked, if that is not understood of itself.

But on the other hand, he who now wishes to, and can retreat cannot
easily be forced to give battle. Now as the advantages to the aggressor
from this retreat are often not sufficient, and a substantial victory
is a matter of urgent necessity for him, in that way the few means
which there are to compel such an opponent also to give battle are often
sought for and applied with particular skill.

The principal means for this are--first SURROUNDING the enemy so as to
make his retreat impossible, or at least so difficult that it is better
for him to accept battle; and, secondly, SURPRISING him. This last way,
for which there was a motive formerly in the extreme difficulty of all
movements, has become in modern times very inefficacious.

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