part of the superiority
obtained, often none at all. In some cases, even, although rarely, the
spirit of revenge and intensified hostility may bring about an opposite
result. On the other hand, whatever is gained in killed, wounded,
prisoners, and guns captured can never disappear from the account.
The losses in a battle consist more in killed and wounded; those
after the battle, more in artillery taken and prisoners. The first the
conqueror shares with the conquered, more or less, but the second not;
and for that reason they usually only take place on one side of the
conflict, at least, they are considerably in excess on one side.
Artillery and prisoners are therefore at all times regarded as the
true trophies of victory, as well as its measure, because through these
things its extent is declared beyond a doubt. Even the degree of moral
superiority may be better judged of by them than by any other relation,
especially if the number of killed and wounded is compared therewith;
and here arises a new power increasing the moral effects.
We have said that the moral forces, beaten to the ground in the
battle and in the immediately succeeding movements, recover themselves
gradually, and often bear no traces of injury; this is the case with
small divisions of the whole, less frequently with large divisions; it
may, however, also be the case with the main Army, but seldom or never
in the State or Government to which the Army belongs. These estimate the
situation more impartially, and from a more elevated point of view,
and recognise in the number of trophies taken by the enemy, and their
relation to the number of killed and wounded, only too easily and well,
the measure of their own weakness and inefficiency.
In point of fact, the lost balance of moral power must not be treated
lightly because it has no absolute value, and because it does not of
necessity appear in all cases in the amount of the results at the
final close; it may become of such excessive weight as to bring down
everything with an irresistible force. On that account it may often
become a great aim of the operations of which we shall speak elsewhere.
Here we have still to examine some of its fundamental relations.
The moral effect of a victory increases, not merely in proportion to
the extent of the forces engaged, but in a progressive ratio--that is
to say, not only in extent, but also in its intensity. In a beaten
detachment order is easily restored. A
|