, must be distinguished from all the other moral
consequences of the loss of equilibrium, is an essential part of the
victory. It is this part alone which acts upon the public opinion
outside the Army, upon the people and the Government in both belligerent
States, and upon all others in any way concerned.

But renouncement of the general object is not quite identical with
quitting the field of battle, even when the battle has been very
obstinate and long kept up; no one says of advanced posts, when they
retire after an obstinate combat, that they have given up their object;
even in combats aimed at the destruction of the enemy's Army, the
retreat from the battlefield is not always to be regarded as a
relinquishment of this aim, as for instance, in retreats planned
beforehand, in which the ground is disputed foot by foot; all this
belongs to that part of our subject where we shall speak of the separate
object of the combat; here we only wish to draw attention to the fact
that in most cases the giving up of the object is very difficult to
distinguish from the retirement from the battlefield, and that the
impression produced by the latter, both in and out of the Army, is not
to be treated lightly.

For Generals and Armies whose reputation is not made, this is in itself
one of the difficulties in many operations, justified by circumstances
when a succession of combats, each ending in retreat, may appear as
a succession of defeats, without being so in reality, and when that
appearance may exercise a very depressing influence. It is impossible
for the retreating General by making known his real intentions to
prevent the moral effect spreading to the public and his troops, for
to do that with effect he must disclose his plans completely, which
of course would run counter to his principal interests to too great a
degree.

In order to draw attention to the special importance of this conception
of victory we shall only refer to the battle of Soor,(*) the trophies
from which were not important (a few thousand prisoners and twenty
guns), and where Frederick proclaimed his victory by remaining for five
days after on the field of battle, although his retreat into Silesia had
been previously determined on, and was a measure natural to his whole
situation. According to his own account, he thought he would hasten a
peace by the moral effect of his victory. Now although a couple of
other successes were likewise required, namely, the b