the
curse of defeat produces in the specific weight of the same elements.

Therefore, even if we are decidedly superior in strength, and are able
to repay the enemy his victory by a greater still, it is always better
to forestall the conclusion of a disadvantageous combat, if it is
of proportionate importance, so as to turn its course rather than to
deliver a second battle.

Field-Marshal Daun attempted in the year 1760 to come to the assistance
of General Laudon at Leignitz, whilst the battle lasted; but when he
failed, he did not attack the King next day, although he did not want
for means to do so.

For these reasons serious combats of advance guards which precede a
battle are to be looked upon only as necessary evils, and when not
necessary they are to be avoided.(*)

(*) This, however, was not Napoleon's view. A vigorous
attack of his advance guard he held to be necessary always,
to fix the enemy's attention and "paralyse his independent
will-power." It was the failure to make this point which, in
August 1870, led von Moltke repeatedly into the very jaws of
defeat, from which only the lethargy of Bazaine on the one
hand and the initiative of his subordinates, notably of von
Alvensleben, rescued him. This is the essence of the new
Strategic Doctrine of the French General Staff. See the
works of Bonnal, Foch, &C.--EDITOR

We have still another conclusion to examine.

If on a regular pitched battle, the decision has gone against one,
this does not constitute a motive for determining on a new one. The
determination for this new one must proceed from other relations. This
conclusion, however, is opposed by a moral force, which we must take
into account: it is the feeling of rage and revenge. From the oldest
Field-Marshal to the youngest drummer-boy this feeling is general, and,
therefore, troops are never in better spirits for fighting than when
they have to wipe out a stain. This is, however, only on the supposition
that the beaten portion is not too great in proportion to the whole,
because otherwise the above feeling is lost in that of powerlessness.

There is therefore a very natural tendency to use this moral force to
repair the disaster on the spot, and on that account chiefly to seek
another battle if other circumstances permit. It then lies in the nature
of the case that this second battle must be an offensive one.

In the catalogue of battles of secon