contingencies.
In the defensive generally, but particularly in the defence of certain
obstacles of ground, like rivers, hills, &c., such contingencies, as is
well known, happen constantly.
But this uncertainty diminishes in proportion as the strategic activity
has less of the tactical character, and ceases almost altogether in
those regions where it borders on politics.
The direction in which the enemy leads his columns to the combat can
be perceived by actual sight only; where he intends to pass a river is
learnt from a few preparations which are made shortly before; the line
by which he proposes to invade our country is usually announced by all
the newspapers before a pistol shot has been fired. The greater the
nature of the measure the less it will take the enemy by surprise. Time
and space are so considerable, the circumstances out of which the action
proceeds so public and little susceptible of alteration, that the coming
event is either made known in good time, or can be discovered with
reasonable certainty.
On the other hand the use of a reserve in this province of Strategy,
even if one were available, will always be less efficacious the more the
measure has a tendency towards being one of a general nature.
We have seen that the decision of a partial combat is nothing in itself,
but that all partial combats only find their complete solution in the
decision of the total combat.
But even this decision of the total combat has only a relative meaning
of many different gradations, according as the force over which the
victory has been gained forms a more or less great and important part of
the whole. The lost battle of a corps may be repaired by the victory
of the Army. Even the lost battle of an Army may not only be
counterbalanced by the gain of a more important one, but converted into
a fortunate event (the two days of Kulm, August 29 and 30, 1813(*)).
No one can doubt this; but it is just as clear that the weight of each
victory (the successful issue of each total combat) is so much the more
substantial the more important the part conquered, and that therefore
the possibility of repairing the loss by subsequent events diminishes in
the same proportion. In another place we shall have to examine this more
in detail; it suffices for the present to have drawn attention to the
indubitable existence of this progression.
(*) Refers to the destruction of Vandamme's column, which
had been sent unsu
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