pported to intercept the retreat of the
Austrians and Prussians from Dresden--but was forgotten by
Napoleon.--EDITOR.

If we now add lastly to these two considerations the third, which is,
that if the persistent use of forces in tactics always shifts the great
result to the end of the whole act, law of the simultaneous use of the
forces in Strategy, on the contrary, lets the principal result (which
need not be the final one) take place almost always at the commencement
of the great (or whole) act, then in these three results we have grounds
sufficient to find strategic reserves always more superfluous, always
more useless, always more dangerous, the more general their destination.

The point where the idea of a strategic reserve begins to become
inconsistent is not difficult to determine: it lies in the SUPREME
DECISION. Employment must be given to all the forces within the space of
the supreme decision, and every reserve (active force available) which
is only intended for use after that decision is opposed to common sense.

If, therefore, tactics has in its reserves the means of not only meeting
unforeseen dispositions on the part of the enemy, but also of repairing
that which never can be foreseen, the result of the combat, should that
be unfortunate; Strategy on the other hand must, at least as far as
relates to the capital result, renounce the use of these means. As A
rule, it can only repair the losses sustained at one point by advantages
gained at another, in a few cases by moving troops from one point to
another; the idea of preparing for such reverses by placing forces in
reserve beforehand, can never be entertained in Strategy.

We have pointed out as an absurdity the idea of a strategic reserve
which is not to co-operate in the capital result, and as it is so beyond
a doubt, we should not have been led into such an analysis as we have
made in these two chapters, were it not that, in the disguise of
other ideas, it looks like something better, and frequently makes its
appearance. One person sees in it the acme of strategic sagacity and
foresight; another rejects it, and with it the idea of any reserve,
consequently even of a tactical one. This confusion of ideas is
transferred to real life, and if we would see a memorable instance of
it we have only to call to mind that Prussia in 1806 left a reserve
of 20,000 men cantoned in the Mark, under Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg,
which could not possibly rea