t also passes to the enemy just as,
figuratively expressed, the difference of a + b and a - b is equal to
2b. Therefore it may so happen that both parties, at one and the same
time, not only feel themselves too weak to attack, but also are so in
reality.

Thus even in the midst of the act of War itself, anxious sagacity and
the apprehension of too great danger find vantage ground, by means of
which they can exert their power, and tame the elementary impetuosity of
War.

However, at the same time these causes without an exaggeration of their
effect, would hardly explain the long states of inactivity which took
place in military operations, in former times, in Wars undertaken about
interests of no great importance, and in which inactivity consumed
nine-tenths of the time that the troops remained under arms. This
feature in these Wars, is to be traced principally to the influence
which the demands of the one party, and the condition, and feeling of
the other, exercised over the conduct of the operations, as has been
already observed in the chapter on the essence and object of War.

These things may obtain such a preponderating influence as to make of
War a half-and-half affair. A War is often nothing more than an armed
neutrality, or a menacing attitude to support negotiations or an attempt
to gain some small advantage by small exertions, and then to wait the
tide of circumstances, or a disagreeable treaty obligation, which is
fulfilled in the most niggardly way possible.

In all these cases in which the impulse given by interest is slight,
and the principle of hostility feeble, in which there is no desire to
do much, and also not much to dread from the enemy; in short, where no
powerful motives press and drive, cabinets will not risk much in the
game; hence this tame mode of carrying on War, in which the hostile
spirit of real War is laid in irons.

The more War becomes in this manner devitalised so much the more its
theory becomes destitute of the necessary firm pivots and buttresses for
its reasoning; the necessary is constantly diminishing, the accidental
constantly increasing.

Nevertheless in this kind of Warfare, there is also a certain
shrewdness, indeed, its action is perhaps more diversified, and more
extensive than in the other. Hazard played with realeaux of gold seems
changed into a game of commerce with groschen. And on this field, where
the conduct of War spins out the time with a number of small flou