general in
an advancing position, by which then its proceedings become modified in
some degree.
CHAPTER XVII. ON THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WAR
THE attention which must be paid to the character of War as it is now
made, has a great influence upon all plans, especially on strategic
ones.
Since all methods formerly usual were upset by Buonaparte's luck and
boldness, and first-rate Powers almost wiped out at a blow; since the
Spaniards by their stubborn resistance have shown what the general
arming of a nation and insurgent measures on a great scale can effect,
in spite of weakness and porousness of individual parts; since Russia,
by the campaign of 1812 has taught us, first, that an Empire of great
dimensions is not to be conquered (which might have been easily known
before), secondly, that the probability of final success does not in all
cases diminish in the same measure as battles, capitals, and provinces
are lost (which was formerly an incontrovertible principle with all
diplomatists, and therefore made them always ready to enter at once into
some bad temporary peace), but that a nation is often strongest in
the heart of its country, if the enemy's offensive power has exhausted
itself, and with what enormous force the defensive then springs over
to the offensive; further, since Prussia (1813) has shown that sudden
efforts may add to an Army sixfold by means of the militia, and
that this militia is just as fit for service abroad as in its own
country;--since all these events have shown what an enormous factor the
heart and sentiments of a Nation may be in the product of its political
and military strength, in fine, since governments have found out all
these additional aids, it is not to be expected that they will let them
lie idle in future Wars, whether it be that danger threatens their own
existence, or that restless ambition drives them on.
That a War which is waged with the whole weight of the national power
on each side must be organised differently in principle to those where
everything is calculated according to the relations of standing Armies
to each other, it is easy to perceive. Standing Armies once resembled
fleets, the land force the sea force in their relations to the remainder
of the State, and from that the Art of War on shore had in it something
of naval tactics, which it has now quite lost.
CHAPTER XVIII. TENSION AND REST
The Dynamic Law of War
WE have seen in the sixteenth chapte
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