its
numerical superiority over that of the enemy increases. Who can doubt
this? A campaign against a much weaker enemy will therefore cost smaller
efforts than against one just as strong or stronger.
So much for the fatigues. It is somewhat different with the privations;
they consist chiefly of two things, the want of food, and the want of
shelter for the troops, either in quarters or in suitable camps. Both
these wants will no doubt be greater in proportion as the number of men
on one spot is greater. But does not the superiority in force afford
also the best means of spreading out and finding more room, and
therefore more means of subsistence and shelter?
If Buonaparte, in his invasion of Russia in 1812, concentrated his Army
in great masses upon one single road in a manner never heard of before,
and thus caused privations equally unparalleled, we must ascribe it to
his maxim THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO BE TOO STRONG AT THE DECISIVE POINT.
Whether in this instance he did not strain the principle too far is a
question which would be out of place here; but it is certain that, if
he had made a point of avoiding the distress which was by that means
brought about, he had only to advance on a greater breadth of front.
Room was not wanted for the purpose in Russia, and in very few cases
can it be wanted. Therefore, from this no ground can be deduced to prove
that the simultaneous employment of very superior forces must produce
greater weakening. But now, supposing that in spite of the general
relief afforded by setting apart a portion of the Army, wind and weather
and the toils of War had produced a diminution even on the part which
as a spare force had been reserved for later use, still we must take a
comprehensive general view of the whole, and therefore ask, Will this
diminution of force suffice to counterbalance the gain in forces, which
we, through our superiority in numbers, may be able to make in more ways
than one?
But there still remains a most important point to be noticed. In a
partial combat, the force required to obtain a great result can be
approximately estimated without much difficulty, and, consequently, we
can form an idea of what is superfluous. In Strategy this may be said
to be impossible, because the strategic result has no such well-defined
object and no such circumscribed limits as the tactical. Thus what can
be looked upon in tactics as an excess of power, must be regarded in
Strategy as a means t
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