, that the superiority in numbers is the most
important factor in the result of a combat, only it must be sufficiently
great to be a counterpoise to all the other co-operating circumstances.
The direct result of this is, that the greatest possible number of
troops should be brought into action at the decisive point.
Whether the troops thus brought are sufficient or not, we have then done
in this respect all that our means allowed. This is the first principle
in Strategy, therefore in general as now stated, it is just as well
suited for Greeks and Persians, or for Englishmen and Mahrattas, as
for French and Germans. But we shall take a glance at our relations in
Europe, as respects War, in order to arrive at some more definite idea
on this subject.
Here we find Armies much more alike in equipment, organisation, and
practical skill of every kind. There only remains a difference in the
military virtue of Armies, and in the talent of Generals which may
fluctuate with time from side to side. If we go through the military
history of modern Europe, we find no example of a Marathon.
Frederick the Great beat 80,000 Austrians at Leuthen with about 30,000
men, and at Rosbach with 25,000 some 50,000 allies; these are however
the only instances of victories gained against an enemy double, or more
than double in numbers. Charles XII, in the battle of Narva, we cannot
well quote, for the Russians were at that time hardly to be regarded as
Europeans, also the principal circumstances, even of the battle, are
too little known. Buonaparte had at Dresden 120,000 against 220,000,
therefore not the double. At Kollin, Frederick the Great did not
succeed, with 30,000 against 50,000 Austrians, neither did Buonaparte
in the desperate battle of Leipsic, where he was 160,000 strong, against
280,000.
From this we may infer, that it is very difficult in the present state
of Europe, for the most talented General to gain a victory over an enemy
double his strength. Now if we see double numbers prove such a weight
in the scale against the greatest Generals, we may be sure, that
in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an important
superiority of numbers, but which need not be over two to one, will
be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other
circumstances may be. Certainly, we may imagine a defile which even
tenfold would not suffice to force, but in such a case it can be no
question of a battle at all.
We
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