ulse to victories at Leuthen and
Montereau," to which great Generals on the defensive have often trusted,
is still, if we would be clear and exact, only a rare occurrence in
history.
Much more frequently the relative superiority--that is, the skilful
assemblage of superior forces at the decisive point--has its foundation
in the right appreciation of those points, in the judicious direction
which by that means has been given to the forces from the very first,
and in the resolution required to sacrifice the unimportant to the
advantage of the important--that is, to keep the forces concentrated in
an overpowering mass. In this, Frederick the Great and Buonaparte are
particularly characteristic.
We think we have now allotted to the superiority in numbers the
importance which belongs to it; it is to be regarded as the fundamental
idea, always to be aimed at before all and as far as possible.
But to regard it on this account as a necessary condition of victory
would be a complete misconception of our exposition; in the conclusion
to be drawn from it there lies nothing more than the value which should
attach to numerical strength in the combat. If that strength is made as
great as possible, then the maxim is satisfied; a review of the total
relations must then decide whether or not the combat is to be avoided
for want of sufficient force.(*)
(*) Owing to our freedom from invasion, and to the condition
which arise in our Colonial Wars, we have not yet, in
England, arrived at a correct appreciation of the value of
superior numbers in War, and still adhere to the idea of an
Army just "big enough," which Clausewitz has so unsparingly
ridiculed. (EDITOR.)
CHAPTER IX. THE SURPRISE
FROM the subject of the foregoing chapter, the general endeavour to
attain a relative superiority, there follows another endeavour which
must consequently be just as general in its nature: this is the
SURPRISE of the enemy. It lies more or less at the foundation of all
undertakings, for without it the preponderance at the decisive point is
not properly conceivable.
The surprise is, therefore, not only the means to the attainment of
numerical superiority; but it is also to be regarded as a substantive
principle in itself, on account of its moral effect. When it is
successful in a high degree, confusion and broken courage in the enemy's
ranks are the consequences; and of the degree to which these multiply
a
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