always produce the
desired effect, we see in examples given by Generals, who may be allowed
to have had the greatest talent in the use of these means, Frederick the
Great and Buonaparte. The first when he left Dresden so suddenly in
July 1760, and falling upon Lascy, then turned against Dresden, gained
nothing by the whole of that intermezzo, but rather placed his affairs
in a condition notably worse, as the fortress Glatz fell in the
meantime.

In 1813, Buonaparte turned suddenly from Dresden twice against Bluecher,
to say nothing of his incursion into Bohemia from Upper Lusatia, and
both times without in the least attaining his object. They were blows in
the air which only cost him time and force, and might have placed him in
a dangerous position in Dresden.

Therefore, even in this field, a surprise does not necessarily meet with
great success through the mere activity, energy, and resolution of the
Commander; it must be favoured by other circumstances. But we by
no means deny that there can be success; we only connect with it a
necessity of favourable circumstances, which, certainly do not occur
very frequently, and which the Commander can seldom bring about himself.

Just those two Generals afford each a striking illustration of this. We
take first Buonaparte in his famous enterprise against Bluecher's
Army in February 1814, when it was separated from the Grand Army, and
descending the Marne. It would not be easy to find a two days' march to
surprise the enemy productive of greater results than this; Bluecher's
Army, extended over a distance of three days' march, was beaten in
detail, and suffered a loss nearly equal to that of defeat in a great
battle. This was completely the effect of a surprise, for if Bluecher
had thought of such a near possibility of an attack from Buonaparte(*)
he would have organised his march quite differently. To this mistake of
Bluecher's the result is to be attributed. Buonaparte did not know all
these circumstances, and so there was a piece of good fortune that mixed
itself up in his favour.

(*) Bluecher believed his march to be covered by Pahlen's
Cossacks, but these had been withdrawn without warning to
him by the Grand Army Headquarters under Schwartzenberg.

It is the same with the battle of Liegnitz, 1760. Frederick the Great
gained this fine victory through altering during the night a position
which he had just before taken up. Laudon was through this complete