ly modified the relative importance and
practicability of surprise. (EDITOR.)
On the other hand, with things which can be done in a day or two, a
surprise is much more conceivable, and, therefore, also it is often not
difficult thus to gain a march upon the enemy, and thereby a position, a
point of country, a road, &c. But it is evident that what surprise gains
in this way in easy execution, it loses in the efficacy, as the greater
the efficacy the greater always the difficulty of execution. Whoever
thinks that with such surprises on a small scale, he may connect great
results--as, for example, the gain of a battle, the capture of an
important magazine--believes in something which it is certainly very
possible to imagine, but for which there is no warrant in history; for
there are upon the whole very few instances where anything great has
resulted from such surprises; from which we may justly conclude that
inherent difficulties lie in the way of their success.
Certainly, whoever would consult history on such points must not depend
on sundry battle steeds of historical critics, on their wise dicta and
self-complacent terminology, but look at facts with his own eyes. There
is, for instance, a certain day in the campaign in Silesia, 1761, which,
in this respect, has attained a kind of notoriety. It is the 22nd July,
on which Frederick the Great gained on Laudon the march to Nossen, near
Neisse, by which, as is said, the junction of the Austrian and Russian
armies in Upper Silesia became impossible, and, therefore, a period of
four weeks was gained by the King. Whoever reads over this occurrence
carefully in the principal histories,(*) and considers it impartially,
will, in the march of the 22nd July, never find this importance; and
generally in the whole of the fashionable logic on this subject, he will
see nothing but contradictions; but in the proceedings of Laudon, in
this renowned period of manoeuvres, much that is unaccountable. How
could one, with a thirst for truth, and clear conviction, accept such
historical evidence?
(*) Tempelhof, The Veteran, Frederick the Great. Compare
also (Clausewitz) "Hinterlassene Werke," vol. x., p. 158.
When we promise ourselves great effects in a campaign from the principle
of surprising, we think upon great activity, rapid resolutions, and
forced marches, as the means of producing them; but that these things,
even when forthcoming in a very high degree, will not
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