egy uses are in fact so extremely
simple, so well known by their constant repetition, that it only appears
ridiculous to sound common sense when it hears critics so frequently
speaking of them with high-flown emphasis. Turning a flank, which has
been done a thousand times, is regarded here as a proof of the most
brilliant genius, there as a proof of the most profound penetration,
indeed even of the most comprehensive knowledge. Can there be in the
book-world more absurd productions?(*)
(*) This paragraph refers to the works of Lloyd, Buelow,
indeed to all the eighteenth-century writers, from whose
influence we in England are not even yet free.--ED.
It is still more ridiculous if, in addition to this, we reflect that the
same critic, in accordance with prevalent opinion, excludes all moral
forces from theory, and will not allow it to be concerned with
anything but the material forces, so that all must be confined to a few
mathematical relations of equilibrium and preponderance, of time and
space, and a few lines and angles. If it were nothing more than this,
then out of such a miserable business there would not be a scientific
problem for even a schoolboy.
But let us admit: there is no question here about scientific formulas
and problems; the relations of material things are all very simple; the
right comprehension of the moral forces which come into play is more
difficult. Still, even in respect to them, it is only in the highest
branches of Strategy that moral complications and a great diversity of
quantities and relations are to be looked for, only at that point where
Strategy borders on political science, or rather where the two become
one, and there, as we have before observed, they have more influence
on the "how much" and "how little" is to be done than on the form of
execution. Where the latter is the principal question, as in the single
acts both great and small in War, the moral quantities are already
reduced to a very small number.
Thus, then, in Strategy everything is very simple, but not on that
account very easy. Once it is determined from the relations of the State
what should and may be done by War, then the way to it is easy to find;
but to follow that way straightforward, to carry out the plan without
being obliged to deviate from it a thousand times by a thousand varying
influences, requires, besides great strength of character, great
clearness and steadiness of mind, and out of
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