in this, that the King's Army
in this campaign was constantly in motion. Twice it marched by wretched
cross-roads, from the Elbe into Silesia, in rear of Daun and pursued by
Lascy (beginning of July, beginning of August). It required to be always
ready for battle, and its marches had to be organised with a degree of
skill which necessarily called forth a proportionate amount of exertion.
Although attended and delayed by thousands of waggons, still its
subsistence was extremely difficult. In Silesia, for eight days before
the battle of Leignitz, it had constantly to march, defiling alternately
right and left in front of the enemy:--this costs great fatigue, and
entails great privations.

Is it to be supposed that all this could have been done without
producing great friction in the machine? Can the mind of a Commander
elaborate such movements with the same ease as the hand of a land
surveyor uses the astrolabe? Does not the sight of the sufferings of
their hungry, thirsty comrades pierce the hearts of the Commander and
his Generals a thousand times? Must not the murmurs and doubts which
these cause reach his ear? Has an ordinary man the courage to demand
such sacrifices, and would not such efforts most certainly demoralise
the Army, break up the bands of discipline, and, in short, undermine its
military virtue, if firm reliance on the greatness and infallibility of
the Commander did not compensate for all? Here, therefore, it is that
we should pay respect; it is these miracles of execution which we should
admire. But it is impossible to realise all this in its full force
without a foretaste of it by experience. He who only knows War from
books or the drill-ground cannot realise the whole effect of this
counterpoise in action; WE BEG HIM, THEREFORE, TO ACCEPT FROM US ON
FAITH AND TRUST ALL THAT HE IS UNABLE TO SUPPLY FROM ANY PERSONAL
EXPERIENCES OF HIS OWN.

This illustration is intended to give more clearness to the course of
our ideas, and in closing this chapter we will only briefly observe that
in our exposition of Strategy we shall describe those separate subjects
which appear to us the most important, whether of a moral or material
nature; then proceed from the simple to the complex, and conclude with
the inner connection of the whole act of War, in other words, with the
plan for a War or campaign.

OBSERVATION.

In an earlier manuscript of the second book are the following passages
endorsed by the author hi