so much the greater effect. The possession of provinces, towns,
fortresses, roads, bridges, magazines, &c., may be the IMMEDIATE object
of a battle, but never the ultimate one. Things of this description
can never be, looked upon otherwise than as means of gaining greater
superiority, so as at last to offer battle to the enemy in such a way
that it will be impossible for him to accept it. Therefore all these
things must only be regarded as intermediate links, steps, as it were,
leading up to the effectual principle, but never as that principle
itself.

3. EXAMPLE.

In 1814, by the capture of Buonaparte's capital the object of the War
was attained. The political divisions which had their roots in Paris
came into active operation, and an enormous split left the power of the
Emperor to collapse of itself. Nevertheless the point of view from which
we must look at all this is, that through these causes the forces and
defensive means of Buonaparte were suddenly very much diminished,
the superiority of the Allies, therefore, just in the same measure
increased, and any further resistance then became IMPOSSIBLE. It was
this impossibility which produced the peace with France. If we suppose
the forces of the Allies at that moment diminished to a like extent
through external causes;--if the superiority vanishes, then at the same
time vanishes also all the effect and importance of the taking of Paris.

We have gone through this chain of argument in order to show that this
is the natural and only true view of the thing from which it derives
its importance. It leads always back to the question, What at any given
moment of the War or campaign will be the probable result of the great
or small combats which the two sides might offer to each other? In the
consideration of a plan for a campaign, this question only is decisive
as to the measures which are to be taken all through from the very
commencement.

4. WHEN THIS VIEW IS NOT TAKEN, THEN A FALSE VALUE IS GIVEN TO OTHER
THINGS.

If we do not accustom ourselves to look upon War, and the single
campaigns in a War, as a chain which is all composed of battles strung
together, one of which always brings on another; if we adopt the idea
that the taking of a certain geographical point, the occupation of an
undefended province, is in itself anything; then we are very likely to
regard it as an acquisition which we may retain; and if we look at
it so, and not as a term in the whole serie