then the Stoic is wrong, who
assents to an error: and you say that nothing is so incompatible with the
character of a wise man as that. But if the principles of Zeno be true,
then we must say the same of the Old Academics and of the Peripatetics;
and as I do not know which is the more wise of the two, I give my assent
to neither. What? when Antiochus in some points disagrees with the Stoics
whom he is so fond of, does he not show that these principles cannot be
approved of by a wise man?

The Stoics assert that all offences are equal: but Antiochus energetically
resists this doctrine. At least, let me consider before I decide which
opinion I will embrace. Cut the matter short, says he, do at last decide
on something. What? The reasons which are given appear to me to be both
shrewd and nearly equal: may I not then be on my guard against committing
a crime? for you called it a crime, Lucullus, to violate a principle; I,
therefore, restrain myself, lest I should assent to what I do not
understand; and this principle I have in common with you.

Here, however, is a much greater difference.--Zeno thinks that a happy life
depends on virtue alone. What says Antiochus? He admits that this is true
of a happy life, but not of the happiest possible life. The first is a
god, who thinks that nothing can be wanting to virtue; the latter is a
miserable man, who thinks that there are many things besides virtue, some
of which are dear to a man, and some even necessary. But I am afraid that
the former may be attributing to virtue more than nature can bear;
especially since Theophrastus has said many things with eloquence and
copiousness on this subject; and I fear that even he may not be quite
consistent with himself. For though he admits that there are some evils
both of body and fortune, he nevertheless thinks that a man may be happy
who is afflicted by them all, provided he is wise. I am perplexed here; at
one time the one opinion appears to me to be more probable, and at another
time the other does. And yet, unless one or the other be true, I think
virtue must be entirely trampled under foot.

XLIV. However, they differ as to this principle. What then? Can we
approve, as true, of those maxims on which they agree; namely, that the
mind of the wise man is never influenced by either desire or joy? Come,
suppose this opinion is a probable one, is this other one so too; namely,
that it never feels either alarm or grief? Cannot the wise fe