defend with such zeal, that he appeared wholly to approve of it; although
Clitomachus affirmed that he never could understand what Carneades
approved of. But if I were to choose to follow him, would not truth
itself, and all sound and proper reason, oppose me? Will you, when honour
consists in despising pleasure, unite honour to pleasure, joining, as it
were, a man to a beast?

XLVI. There is now, then, only one pair of combatants left--pleasure and
honour; between which Chrysippus, as far as I can see, was not long in
perplexity how to decide. If you follow the one, many things are
overthrown, especially the fellowship of the human race, affection,
friendship, justice, and all other virtues, none of which can exist at all
without disinterestedness: for the virtue which is impelled to action by
pleasure, as by a sort of wages, is not really virtue, but only a
deceitful imitation and pretence of virtue. Listen, on the contrary, to
those men who say that they do not even understand the name of honour,
unless we call that honourable which is accounted reputable by the
multitude; that the source of all good is in the body; that this is the
law, and rule, and command of nature; and that he who departs from it will
never have any object in life to follow. Do you think, then, that I am not
moved when I hear these and innumerable other statements of the same kind?
I am moved as much as you are, Lucullus; and you need not think me less a
man than yourself. The only difference is that you, when you are agitated,
acquiesce, assent, and approve; you consider the impression which you have
received true, certain, comprehended, perceived, established, firm, and
unalterable; and you cannot be moved or driven from it by any means
whatever. I think that there is nothing of such a kind that, if I assent
to it, I shall not often be assenting to what is false; since there is no
distinct line of demarcation between what is true and what is false,
especially as the science of dialectics has no power of judging on this
subject.

I come now to the third part of philosophy. There is an idea advanced by
Protagoras, who thinks that that is true to each individual which seems so
to him; and a completely different one put forward by the Cyrenaics, who
think that there is no such thing as certain judgment about anything
except the inner feelings: and a third, different from either, maintained
by Epicurus, who places all judgment in the senses, and i