ter the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His
intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of
God is the cause of things.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude
election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,
that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain
things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.

Reply Obj. 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and will,
from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts
after the mode of intellect and will.

Reply Obj. 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore,
"Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is
the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A. 2, ad
2).

Reply Obj. 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is
knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived,
and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect
only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except
by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to
operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it
denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these
things are one.
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FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 5]

Whether Any Cause Can Be Assigned to the Divine Will?

Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine
will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say
that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what
is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the
will of God has some cause.

Obj. 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and
whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause
of all things, as has been already shown (A. 4). If, then, there is
no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause,
except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,
since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems
inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine
will.

Obj. 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause,
depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no
cause, it follows that all things made de