place. Neither on
this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares
unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary
to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted
as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given
gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases
(provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of
justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is
thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?"
(Matt. 20:14,15).
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 6]
Whether Predestination Is Certain?
Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because
on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy
crown," (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another
will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown
which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost.
Therefore predestination cannot be certain.
Obj. 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible
follows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may
sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that
the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not
impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.
Obj. 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do
now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined.
Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore
predestination is not certain.
_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew, He also
predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and
preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will
most certainly be freed."
_I answer that,_ Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes
effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its
effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A.
1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things
subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from
contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which
divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of
providence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 4). So also
the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not
destroyed; whence the effect of predestina
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