ould not result other things, nor another order of things, than
that which now is. But we showed above (Q. 19, A. 3) that God
does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of
all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity
determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present
course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other
things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power
is restricted to this present course of events through the order of
the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But
since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His
wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the
divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the
divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the
order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion
of His justice consists, as said above (Q. 21, A. 2), is not so
adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be
restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the
whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is
taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things
made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some
definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all
proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so
restricted to any particular order that no other course of events
could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other
things than those He has done.

Reply Obj. 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct
from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will
from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the
just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,
will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,
there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His
just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will
cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,
except upon supposition, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), neither are
the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as
was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the
divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the
ord