ther genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in
their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a
subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what
refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the
nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature
are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such
relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found
an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the
heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same
applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another,
signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of
reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation
only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the
species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of
the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of
procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real
relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in
the identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2,
4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are
necessarily real relations.

Reply Obj. 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its
proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper
meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but
only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not
wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was
not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in
Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of
relation to another.

Reply Obj. 2: The relation signified by the term "the same" is a
logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;
because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by
reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some
two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are
called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically.
Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity,
not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance
is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation
of identity.

Reply Obj. 3: As the creature proceeds from