any way repugnant to the divine
simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it.
Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the
divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human
intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own
mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence
its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to
signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete
terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by
abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their
subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.
But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in
the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but
the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity
and Father.
Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the
obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask:
"Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?" as we
answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be
some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are
distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an
abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine
essence is signified as "What"; and the person as "Who"; and the
property as "Whereby."
The second motive is because one person in God is related to two
persons--namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son
and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one
relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy
Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation.
Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow
that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it
be said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to
creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the
Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost;
whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations.
For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to
another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically
different if but one opposite relation correspo
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