re it is to be the similitude of
its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so
also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is
properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the
Son is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, "God
so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son" (John 3:16).
Reply Obj. 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the
Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the
origin of the Holy Ghost--that is, His procession.
Reply Obj. 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver;
but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore,
because "Gift" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called
a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been
given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.
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QUESTION 39
OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE
(In Eight Articles)
Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely,
we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence,
to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of
these with each other.
As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?
(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?
(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in
the plural, or in the singular?
(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be
predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?
(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in
the abstract?
(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete
essential names?
(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?
(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 1]
Whether in God the Essence Is the Same As the Person?
Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as
person. For whenever essence is the same as person or _suppositum,_
there can be only one _suppositum_ of one nature, as is clear in the
case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really
one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But
in God there is one essen
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