: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by
the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the
persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by
themselves, and not by the relation.
Obj. 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its
genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But
"hypostasis" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.
Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.
Obj. 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But
the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.
Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.
Obj. 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first
principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which
comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is
towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God
cannot be relation.
_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.): "Relation alone
multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons."
_I answer that,_ In whatever multitude of things is to be found
something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of
distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence,
we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are
several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the
divine persons, and these are "origin" and "relation." Although these
do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification;
for "origin" is signified by way of act, as "generation"; and
"relation" by way of the form, as "paternity."
Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that
the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say
that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former
begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the
properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons
as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest
the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the
material principles.
This opinion, however, cannot stand--for two reasons. Firstly,
because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their
distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic
to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or t
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