trary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says:
"It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional
acts are to be placed in God.

_I answer that,_ In the divine persons distinction is founded on
origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts.
Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we
must attribute notional acts to the persons.

Reply Obj. 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a
twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from
Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions
which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures
from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God
regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts
which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because
the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons,
as is clear from what was above explained (Q. 32, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the
persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are
altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and
nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D,
xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing
from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be
changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some
cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement;
for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called
"passion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another
and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we
take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin,
in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is
from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists,
the personal action of the one producing a person is only the
habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle;
which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we
cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the
manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and
wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ
from the relations which result from action and passion, and
therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of