re a time when
He was not," as Arius said.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 3]
Whether in the Divine Persons There Exists an Order of Nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does
not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the
essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not
signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore
there is no order of nature in God.
Obj. 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes
before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in
the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as
declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no
order of nature.
Obj. 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists.
But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is
not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.
Obj. 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But
there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there
of nature.
_On the contrary,_ Where plurality exists without order, confusion
exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius
says. Therefore in God order exists.
_I answer that,_ Order always has reference to some principle.
Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely, according
to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of
demonstration; and according to each individual cause--so are there
many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without
priority, exists in God as we have stated (Q. 33, A. 1): so there
must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and
this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine
(Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby
one is from another."
Reply Obj. 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in
general, not a special kind of origin.
Reply Obj. 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a
principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle
still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally
considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of
cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding
therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in
the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one
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