o hold the opinion of the newness of the whole
world.

Reply Obj. 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not
be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6);
because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without
succession; but with the world it is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to
term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there
is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection
is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite
number of mean terms.

Reply Obj. 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to
infinity _per se_--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes
that are _per se_ required for a certain effect; for instance, that a
stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to
infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity
_accidentally_ as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the
causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one
cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by
means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may
be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer
acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to
this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for
he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men
generating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz. the grade of a
particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be
generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible
if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an
elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Reply Obj. 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this
reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to
be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of
Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But
this was disproved above (Q. 7, A. 4). Some say that the soul is
corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will
remain. But others, as Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4, 5; De
Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a
circuit of souls--viz. that souls separated from their bodies return
again thither after a course of time; a fuller conside