he falls into fault.

Reply Obj. 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said
that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent
in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to
the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as
including the idea of injury.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 6]

Whether Pain Has the Nature of Evil More Than Fault Has?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For
fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good
than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault
has.

Obj. 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the
greater good. But pain, as was said above (A. 5), is opposed to
the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the
action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it
seems that pain is worse than fault.

Obj. 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in
forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation
of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.

_On the contrary,_ A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to
prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole
body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore
fault is a greater evil than pain.

_I answer that,_ Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not
only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal
goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any
kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to
include privation of grace or glory.

There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil
by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says
(Div. Nom. iv): "To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to
be made worthy of punishment." And this because, since good absolutely
considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate
act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that
the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use
of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will.
Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is
called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a
bad will can use ill even the good he