1: There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not,
indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of
creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type, according to
which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the
creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists
first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very
fashioning of the creature."

Reply Obj. 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to
pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination,
which form is without matter but not without material conditions,
stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and
the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from
matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful
the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an
intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the
nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no
imagination, as was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Even granted that he
could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he
would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has
connatural intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what
is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not
purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the
purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 3]

Whether the Higher Angels Understand by More Universal Species Than
the Lower Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand
by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,
seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not
understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be
said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less
universal.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known
than what is known generically; because to know anything generically
is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore,
the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it
follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the
lower; which is not befitt