of the heavens. This
opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know
a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as
singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing
from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to
happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking
place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and
movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.
Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various
powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending
universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things
singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his
one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that
the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and
far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common
sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one
faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses,
and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the
difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in
other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of
nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his
powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge,
namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it
ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be
unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; _Metaph._ text. 15).
The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered
from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may
subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that
they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes
forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature,
but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of
individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the
thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He
causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as
was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which
He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows
all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to
their singularity; so through the species
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