; and there
is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the
angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated
in _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 2]

Whether in the Angels the Will Differs from the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ
from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple
than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form
towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the
angel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists,
or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel
inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an
intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to
the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his
nature or his intellect.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the
object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ,
not really but only logically [*Cf. Q. 16, A. 4]. Therefore will
and intellect are not really different.

Obj. 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not
differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives
color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually
related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to
wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good,
does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

_On the contrary,_ The will in the angels regards good things only,
while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know
both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their
intellect.

_I answer that,_ In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,
which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not
their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a
thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to
anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies
that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded
to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before
possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when
once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes
from something superadded to the essence; as tendenc