d's sake, is the love of choice.
There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the
part of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q. 59, A. 2), the
mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known
within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual
nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things
capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is
moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive
faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards
things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are
appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to
something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring,
for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else
from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the
intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not
deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found
in them both natural love and love of choice.
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which
are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle
thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (Q. 62).
Reply Obj. 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as
rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love
is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said
above (Q. 59, A. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice
does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human
choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
_______________________
THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 4]
Whether the Angel Loves Himself with Both Natural Love, and Love of
Choice?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both
with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A. 2),
natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the
means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot
be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the
love of choice cannot have the same object.
Obj. 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a
uniting and a binding power." But uniting and binding imply various
th
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