man
from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so
far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not
merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there
can be something that we will, and something that we will not.
Reply Obj. 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so
also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, "He was made
to fear no one," this is to be understood of the fear of God which
restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that "the devils
believe and tremble" (James 2:19).
Reply Obj. 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin
bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin
is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, or for the
evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the
goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that "sorrow for good lost by
punishment, is the witness to a good nature." Consequently, since the
demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil
of sin.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 4]
Whether Our Atmosphere Is the Demons' Place of Punishment?
Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'
place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a
spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no
place of punishment for demons.
Obj. 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But
man's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the
demons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome
atmosphere.
Obj. 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.
But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the
darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that "the
darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment
day."
_I answer that,_ The angels in their own nature stand midway between
God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it
procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But
man's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of
all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;
and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,
indirectl
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