n only arise from free-will, and consequently all
inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,
corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the
former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on
account of God's goodness.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): "The Lord hath made all
things for Himself."

_I answer that,_ Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal
creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in
punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that
God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal
nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,
and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given a
higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others
turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies
according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is
erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture,
which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal
creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" (Gen. 1), as if to
say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was
good for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal
creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but
that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it
would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal
world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made
what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin
of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual
creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the
sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so
of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible.
Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the
entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists
of its parts.

Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that
whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the
sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,
that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses
for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all
parts are for the perfection of the whole, as