g to Ps.
103:24: "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to
wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_
(i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the
higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii,
4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the
corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the
higher.
Obj. 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,
since like always produces like. If then all creatures, both
spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there
would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further
removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the
Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are
far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).
Obj. 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite
effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be,
and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in
suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is
possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to
that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): "In the beginning God
created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal
creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.
_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from
God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from
Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until
the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is
untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by
creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of
coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and
it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.
In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,
the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the
underlying principle in things is always more universal than that
which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than
living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely,
then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing
proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies prim
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