was upon the face of the deep." The remaining
distinctions will appear from what follows (Q. 71).
_______________________
SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 2]
Whether the Formless Matter of All Corporeal Things Is the Same?
Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal
things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find
two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he
says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby,
he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore
the matter of all corporeal things is the same.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): "Things
that are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal things
are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is
the same.
Obj. 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and
the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the
same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.
Obj. 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in
potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter
considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.
_On the contrary,_ Things of which the matter is the same are
mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said
(De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act
upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.
_I answer that,_ On this question the opinions of philosophers have
differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies
are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four
elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and
corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the
same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed
by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the
artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies:
"By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you
are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that
binds you together." But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5)
disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the
heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the
elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For
movement in a circle, which
|