ch good acts to evil purpose.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 3]
Whether There Is Sorrow in the Demons?
Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For
since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the
same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing
against the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: "The devil
has power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices
over this sinister power." Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.
Obj. 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things
cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are
present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,
"Who was made to fear no one." Therefore there is no grief in the
demons.
Obj. 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the
demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least
for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.
_On the contrary,_ The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man
is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin,
according to Apoc. 18:7, "As much as she hath glorified herself, and
lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her."
Consequently much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow,
because he especially glorified himself.
_I answer that,_ Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are
passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the
sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,
however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the
demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because
sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the
resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is
evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are,
and others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish
others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said
to exist in them: and especially because it is of the very notion of
punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are
deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked
will is curbed in many respects.
Reply Obj. 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but
not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a
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