ry agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But
nature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards
anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does
not love God more than himself from natural love.

Obj. 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self.
But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for "it is
poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to
them," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels
do not love God more than themselves by natural love.

Obj. 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the
love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who
sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), "Two loves have made two
cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the
earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made
the heavenly city." Therefore it is not natural to love God more
than self.

_On the contrary,_ All the moral precepts of the law come of the law
of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral
precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature.
Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.

_I answer that,_ There have been some who maintained that an angel
loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of
concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather
than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in
so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;
because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he
wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the
natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he
naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.

The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider
whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because
the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of
the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual
nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally
belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that
other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural
tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature:
because "according as a thing is moved naturally, it ha