fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they
are not obstinate in malice.
Obj. 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any
good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses
the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of
God" (Mark 1:24). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (James
2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what
is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand." Therefore
they are not obstinate in malice.
_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that
hate Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the
demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.
_I answer that,_ It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that
every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to
good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of
the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of
true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature
of true beatitude; hence it is termed "life everlasting." It is also
contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that
demons and wicked men shall be sent "into everlasting punishment,"
and the good brought "into everlasting life." Consequently such an
opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic
Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels
is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate
in evil.
We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of
the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to men, what the fall is
to the angels." Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave
or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they
are without remission and endure for ever.
To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind
that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the
apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For
the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks
the universal good, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 1); as also the
sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers
universals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this
respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovabl
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