here can be other sins in the angels
besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any
kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even
in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,
3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.
Obj. 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth,
avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit,
just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there
be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices
spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is
granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and
envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other
vices in them.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil
"is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort;
yet he is proud and envious."
_I answer that,_ Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all
by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are
in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of
all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons
which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot
be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by
such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is
affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited
to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good
of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the
superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride--not to be
subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first
sin of the angel can be none other than pride.
Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,
since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on
its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines
over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his
neighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good
could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked
angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which
would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other.
So, after the sin of p
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