exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or
concupiscible appetite in the angels.

_I answer that,_ The intellective appetite is not divided into
irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so
divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are
distinguished from one another not according to the material but only
by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond
an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction
of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things
contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the
power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of
sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white:
whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white,
then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the
faculty of seeing black.

Now it is quite evident from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1),
that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the
will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can
there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the
intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the
distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite
is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its
common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly,
since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their
appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but
remains undivided; and it is called the will.

Reply Obj. 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in
the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;--on account of
the resemblance in the effect.

Reply Obj. 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in
the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple
act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to
love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to
repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these
things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei ix).

Reply Obj. 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible
appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible
appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine
goodness, which is the ob