nd they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet
they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by
syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.
Reply Obj. 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by
way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are
present, yet without any discursion withal.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 4]
Whether the Angels Understand by Composing and Dividing?
Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and
dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there
is composition of the same, as is said in _De Anima_ iii, text. 21. But
there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because
angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at
one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's
mind.
Obj. 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than
any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is
that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant
natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what
was said (A. 2). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by
diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and
dividing.
Obj. 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking
to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are
signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest
from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the
angel understands by composing and dividing.
_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the
intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear
simplicity of divine concepts." But a simple intelligence is without
composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without
composition or division.
_I answer that,_ As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion
is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and
dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our
intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the
principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In
like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the
subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed
to, or removed from, the subject, it would never
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