els. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.

Obj. 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom,
and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its
intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons.
Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that
"the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83,
qu. 32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of
intelligence" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood
in the angel's knowledge.

_I answer that,_ The truth of this question depends partly upon what
has gone before. For it has been said (A. 4) that an angel
understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what
a thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing
is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in _De
Anima_ iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep
in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of
composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of
one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang
together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature,
"a four-footed flying beast," for there is no such animal. And this
comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn
from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But
there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is
stated in _Metaph._ ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at
all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known
precisely as they exist.

So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in
the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very
differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the
quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by
division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition.
Such is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of
the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said
regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can
be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such
thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's
supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing t